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age into ... an uncharted sea,"33 preferring the comfortable predictibility
of stare decisis to individualized justice. In this still inchoate area of
law, however, a case-by-case development of rules without rigid adherence
to any one theory is necessary in order to establish sound principles.
"The objective is to achieve justice in a particular case and cases of like
kind, avoiding ideology, on the one hand, and particularistic result-ori-
ented determinations, on the other." 4 This rational approach would
end ad hoc decisions. If a court, choosing between particular state laws,
can identify the policies embodied in those laws and determine if a true
conflict exists,35 then it should use the facts or contacts to determine
which state has a better claim, giving weight to the parties' expectations
and other countervailing considerations. A few wide-sweeping rules
could thus be avoided. This process would give hope that decisions
founded upon discriminating assessments of policies and expectations
will slowly build up a body of differentiated rules to which courts can
adhere, bringing predictibility back into play. North Carolina for the
present is content with lex loci. Perhaps a rule so well defined as the
'(greatest interest rule' will cause the court to reassess its status quo
position and perceive the possible individualized justice for each case and
a possible predictibility therein.
ERIC Miuzs HOLMES
Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-One Man, One Vote
Applied to Local Governing Bodies
The one man, one vote rule of the United States Supreme Court has.
been described as "the symbol of an aspiration for fairness, for avoidance
of complexity and for intelligibility in our representational processes in
our mass democracy." 1 By Avery v. Midland County,2 the Court has
expanded the equal representation concept of Reynolds v. Sims3 and its
" Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
122 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 890, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 752. See also THE:
CHOIcE-OF-LAw PROCESS 121-23.
"See geterally, Traynor, supra note 15; Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 74 (1967).
'Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What Is Fair Representation?, 5I
A.B.A.J. 319, 324 (1965).390 U.S. 474 (1968).
'377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court said:
[W]e conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity
for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.
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companion cases4 from the statehouses of the nation to thousands of
county courthouses, city councils, school districts, and similar local gov-
.erning bodies. Phrased simply, the decision means that many, if not
most, representative bodies elected on the local level must be chosen
.under a scheme whereby the men who sit on them represent substantially
equal numbers of people.5 Avery itself did not commence the trend of
applying the one man, one vote rule to local government; but it did settle
the issue in favor of a line of state and lower federal court cases so ex-
-tending the Reynolds principle." The decision is significant 7 because the
,Court for a time declined any opportunity to apply the rule to local gov-
ernments and governing boards after the Reynolds decision.
8
The holding in Avery brings to a predictable conclusion the trend
begun when the Court decided in Baker v. Carr' that apportionment and
Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment ...
Id. at 566.
'Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Ass., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm.
for Fair Rep. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
US. 633 (1964).
5390 U.S. at 478-79.
' The majority opinion in Avery mentioned several cases from state supreme
courts and federal district courts extending Reynolds to local governments. 390
U.S. at 479 n.3. But see Bianchi v. Griffing, 271 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 901 (1967); Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala.
1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Johnson v. Genesee County,
232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Simon v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury,
226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964). As the only state supreme court holdings
contrary to its decision in Avery, the Court cited Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377
Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966), where the Michigan court divided four to four
on the issue; and the Texas Supreme Court decision in Avery v. Midland County,
406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), which was vacated and remanded to the Texas
court.
" In the month after the announcement of Avery, for instance, both the Col-
orado and Iowa supreme courts cited and followed it in deciding cases challenging
the constitutionality of local governing boards. Hartman v. City & County of
Denver,-- Colo. -, 440 P.2d 778 (1968) (city council); Mandicino v. Kelly,
- Iowa - , 158 N.W.2d 754 (1968) (county board of supervisors). Avery
should also be a strong argument for the plaintiffs in a North Carolina reap-
portionment case, Jacobs v. Gaston County, filed in Gaston County Superior Court,
challenging the constitutionality of the Gaston County Board of Commissioners.
A news report of the suit is contained in The Charlotte Observer, Sept. 24, 1968,
§ 2, at 1, col. 1.
8 Bianchi v. Griffing, 389 U.S. 901, denying cert. to 271 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y.
1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), vacating and remanding
256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966). As will be discussed at length, the Court
had valid, practical reasons for not extending the application of one man, one vote
to local governments in both Sailors and Dusch.
p369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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districting is a justiciable issue in federal courts and not merely a political
question. But the Court in Avery also crossed the line that remained
after its decision in Reynolds. Was the crossing of that line a mistake
that constitutes a rigid, unwise approach with respect to the multitude of
local governmental units of varying sizes and purposes, having general
governmental powers? Or does application of the mathematically simple
one man, one vote rule to local entities still retain sufficient flexibility to
enable courts to reach desirable solutions in reapportionment cases in-
volving local governments?
Midland County, Texas, was governed by a five-member board called
the Midland County Commissioners Court, which performed various
legislative, executive, and judicial functions. One member, the county
judge, was elected at large by the voters of the county; however, he could
vote only in case of a tie. The other four commissioners were chosen
from four districts with an estimated population of 67,906 for the city
of Midland, and 852, 828, and 414 for the three rural districts.'0 Thus,
the urban area containing 95 per cent of the population could at most
elect two representatives (one of them the county judge) to the commis-
sioners court. The commissioners were responsible for such general gov-
ernmental functions as letting contracts in the name of the county; ap-
pointing minor county administrative officials; setting the county tax
rate, including that of property owners in the city, within limits con-
trolled by the state; issuing bonds; and determining the county budget.'1
On these facts, Justice White reasoned for the majority: "[I]nsti-
tutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our
system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of in-
creasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citi-
zens."' 2 Using this policy for extending the one man, one vote principle
to local governments, the Court held: "[T]he Constitution permits no
substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units
of local government having general governmental powers over the entire
geographic area served by the body."' 3
"'Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
"Id."'Id. at 481.
"Id. at 484-85. The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Texas Supreme
Court, which had ruled that the equal protection clause was violated by the ap-
portionment of districts in Midland County but that factors other than population
might be taken into account in reapportioning the county. 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
1966). The Texas Supreme Court had reversed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
That court, in turn, had reversed the trial court. 397 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.
1965). - "J"414-1
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Justices Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart dissented. 4 Justice Harlan
restated his general disapproval of Reynolds"5 and also reasoned that
local governing bodies are so diverse in their functions that they need
to be more flexible in their structure than do state legislatures."' Justice
Stewart's rationale was the same as in his dissenting opinion in Lucas
v. Colorado General Assembly,17 where he protested that the principle
of one man, one vote as applied to even state legislatures meant a sim-
plistic, arithmetical approach.
While agreeing that the application of the equal protection clause in
reapportionment situations should not stop at the state level, Justice
Fortas also emphasized that equal protection of voters on the local level
requires more than a simplistic and blanket one man, one vote approach.'"
He appeared particularly impressed by the fact that testimony at the
trial level disclosed county roads to be the main concern of the county
commissioners. He also stressed that the state had placed a ceiling on
the tax rate set by the commissioners.
The Fortas dissent cited both Dusch v. Davis" and Sailors v. Board
of Education ° to illustrate that the Court had not in the past insisted
on a rigid application of one man, one vote to local government. Al-
though the majority in Avery specifically pointed with favor to both of
these cases,2 the cases can be distinguished from Avery on their facts.
Sailors involved what the Court characterized as an appointment of a
county-wide school board by various local school boards representing
variously populated districts; and Dusch involved an at large election
of city council members, some of whom were required to reside in dis-
tricts containing substantially unequal numbers of people.
Insofar as Justice Fortas relied on the legislative limitations on
the county commissioners' powers, his dissent may be rebutted.
If it is contended that unlimited discretion is necessary for the ex-
ercise of true legislative power, then no legislative body in the Amer-
ican system of government would qualify since each body receives its
grants of power from constitutions and/or legislation which limits
the scope of the power granted .... The current trend at the county
1 All of the dissenters thought that the writ of certiorari had been improv-
idently granted.
1r 390 U.S. at 487 (dissenting opinion).
16 Id. at 490-92.
377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
'8 390 U.S. at 498-99 (dissenting opinion).
'o387 U.S. 112 (1967).
.0 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
21390 U.S. at 485.
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governing level is toward more exercise of this legislative power since
the modern urban county has been forced into exercising its legislative
authority more and more in choosing which of a broad array of pro-
grams available to it will be effectuated in a county.2
Avery applies the one man, one vote formula to certain local governing
bodies, but does not attempt to precisely define what local bodies may be
included among those having "general governmental powers." Clearly
the decision encompasses such entities as county governing boards and
city councils with at least as much legislative power as was held by the
county commissioners court in Avery. But there are myriad bodies ex-
ercising governmental power at the local level, many of them having only
one function such as sanitation or education. The Court noted in Avery
that in 1967 there were an estimated 81,304 units of government of
"staggering diversity" throughout the nation."3 One analyst of the Court's
reapportionment decisions suggests three criteria for deciding whether
the local body has "general governmental powers" over a geographic
area: (1) What functions does the entity have? If few, the courts have
justification for not applying the one man, one vote principle. (2) Is the
organization a special purpose unit, such as a port authority? If so, a
general local government is probably not involved. (3) To what extent
is the selection of members of the unit based on equal representation?
The more limited the unit's functions, the greater the variance that courts
should allow from the one man, one vote formula.24
A lawyer attempting to predict whether a certain local governing
body will come under Avery must apply the above criteria cautiously and
critically. For instance, school boards generally have one basic function
designed to fulfill a specific purpose; but where their members are elected,
several courts have specifically held that they fall under the one man,
one vote test ;25 and language in Avery itself indicates that the Supreme
Court considered school boards to be among the type of local govern-
mental entities it had in mind.2" In fact, under the rationale of Gray v.
" Oden & Meek, County Reapportionment: A Rebuttal, 18 BAYLOR L. Rzv.
15, 16-17 (1966).
'3390 U.S. at 483.
24 Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Coun-
ties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 21, 32-33
(1965). This article contains an excellent discussion of the various types of local
governmental units and the effect that extension of the one man, one vote rule
would have on them.
"2E.g., Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Delozier
v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).'a 390 U.S. at 480.
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Sanders' 7 all locally-elected officials-including those with strictly ad-
ministrative duties-might be held to come under the one man, one vote
principle. Until more case law develops in this area, predictions concern-
ing specific categories of local governing bodies and officials may be dif-
ficult in close situations. Perhaps the only entities that will eventually
escape application of the rule are those whose members sit as the result
of a scheme more in the nature of appointment than of election.2"
Avery probably has carried not only the Reynolds rule itself into the
area of local government, but also the holdings of cases answering cer-
tain problems raised by Reynolds.2" However, Avery did leave unsettled
the population standard on which local representation is to be based,
Is it sheer population figures? Or registered voters? Or the number of
people who voted in the last election? Perhaps Hartman v. City & County
of Denver,30 a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court based primarily
on Avery, provides the answer to these questions. The court said that
reliance on the number of registered voters is not per se unconstitutional,
but in applying such figures a local government cannot "depart signif-
icantly from population-oriented standards."3 1
The most difficult issue raised by Avery is the problem of applying
the one man, one vote principle to obtain truly meaningful representa-
tion for the local electorate. To Mr. Justice Fortas, the decision in Avery
meant that the county residents would be denied meaningful representa-
tion because only in the "most superficial sense" did the commissioners
have general governmental powers, 2 their primary concern being the
construction of county roads. Even if he were correct in his analysis of
the facts, his well-reasoned dissent may be answered by the Sailors and
Dusch cases along with the majority opinion in Avery. Together the
2372 U.S. 368 (1963). The Court held that the Georgia system of voting
for senators and other statewide elected officials, including the governor and other
administrative officials, was violative of the fourteenth amendment since it resulted
in a substantial dilution of the electors' votes.
28 Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
For instance, it would appear that local governmental entities may establish
multi-member districts so long as their use is not designed to discriminate against
or cancel out some minority racial or political element. See Burns v. Richardson,
384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Mann v. Davis,
245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va.), aff'd nem. sub. nor. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S.
42 (1965). But cf. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and
remanded, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556
(1964). It also appears that a local government must be reapportioned at least
once every decennial based upon the census to satisfy the Constitutional require-
ment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964).
- Colo. - , 440 P.2d 778 (1968).
Id. at - , 440 P.2d at 783.
82 390 U.S. at 507 (dissenting opinion).
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opinions in the three cases indicate that local governments do have some
justification for experimentation and flexibility if they also recognize
the equal protection principle. For instance, if it were conceded that the
county commissioners' most important function in Midland County is
maintaining county roads, a scheme whereby all commissioners were
voted on at large but one or two of them were required to reside in a
rural geographical area might well be satisfactory.3 Such a scheme
would approach the facts approved in Dusch and would recognize the
one man, one vote principle since every citizen would have an equal vote
in determining the makeup of the county commissioners. However, some
flexibility would be preserved so that rural areas would have a voice on a
matter of vital importance to them. In Dusch, the scheme, while giving
rural areas a significant voice, nevertheless gave majority representation
to the urban areas that contained most of the population. The Court will
almost certainly demand that a majority of the population in any system
keep a majority voice even if the minority is given representation greater
than its mere numbers call for.
Thus, one solution to an inflexible and unjust application of the
one man, one vote rule in a fact situation involving local districts is
the use of residency requirements for political candidates. Avery leaves
unanswered the problem of exactly what type of residency require-
ments will satisfy the equal protection principle. The facts of Dusch
perhaps give the best indication of what the Court may be willing to ac-
cept if a valid and non-discriminatory reason underpins the scheme. In
Mandicino v. Kelly, 4 the Supreme Court of Iowa, in the month follow-
ing Avery, struck down a residency scheme under which a city with
eighty per cent of a county's population could elect only two of the resi-
dent supervisors on the five-member county board. However, the Iowa
court was careful to distinguish this fact situation from that in Dusch. 5
The Iowa decision, as does Avery, has strong implications for a
North Carolina local reapportionment case pending in Gaston County.
36
" See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), which held that the Georgia
Senate was properly apportioned. In that case, senators in certain large counties
entitled to more than one senator could be nominated and elected by the county
at large; but they were required to live within districts in the county. The Court
deemed senators elected by an entire county to be representatives of the entire
county
c t Iowa , 158 N.W.2d 754 (1968). Cf. Secretary of State v. Bryson,
244 Md. 418, 224 A.2d 277 (1966).
- Iowa at -, 158 N.W.2d at 763.
=' See the newspaper article, cited note 7 supra, for more details and back-
ground on the suit.
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Gaston's Board of County Commissioners presently consists of six mem-
bers elected at large, but each one must reside in a different township. 7
The townships allegedly vary substantially in population, with the larg-
est-the city of Gastonia-containing 45 per cent of the total county
population and the smallest having only six per cent. 8 While each town-
ship doubtless can point out valid policy reasons for being individually
represented on the county board, the facts listed above appear much
closer to Mandicino v. Kelly than to Dusch. Were Gaston County in
some way to insure majority representation to the two townships having
the large majority of the population, the North Carolina Supreme Court
might decide that there would be no constitutional objection to the plan ;"O
but Gaston County's present scheme is almost certain to be held violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
40
The broad language of Avery can clearly be misapplied to vitiate its
policy of meaningful representation for citizens on the local level. Later
in the month in which Avery was handed down, a federal court in Gor-
don v. Meeks applied it to uphold an Alabama law against "single shot"
voting.41 The plaintiff contended that the law denied him equal pro-
tection, since it in effect forced him to vote for certain candidates for
Birmingham's city council whom he found unacceptable, or find his
ballot for one or two candidates invalidated. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals turned the reasoning of Avery against the plaintiff and held
that it would not permit "single shot" voting since the plaintiff's vote
for one council position would count more than another's who voted to
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-5 (Supp. 1967).
" Complaint at 3, Jacobs v. Gaston County, Gaston County Super. Ct. (1968).
" See generally Hobbs v. County of Moore, 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E.2d 1 (1966),
where the North Carolina Supreme Court approved residency requirements for
five of seven members of the county board of education that were to be elected
by the county at large. Because two members could reside anywhere in the
county, and because two more had to live in the two cities in the county, the
urban areas could elect four of the seven board members. Because all mem-
bers were elected at large, the urban areas also had a voice in the selection
of the other three. The suit in Gaston County is based upon Woodard v. Carteret
County, 270 N.C. 55, 153 S.E.2d 809 (1967). The North Carolina Supreme Court
there said the issue of whether the one man, one vote principle is applicable to
county commissioners is justiciable in the North Carolina courts.
,0 See generally Sanders, Equal Representation and the Board of County Com-
mnissioners, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, April, 1965, at 1, for a discussion of tile effect
the one man, one vote rule is likely to have on various counties in North Carolina.
The author predicts that the United States Supreme Court may eventually go so
far as to hold that residency requirements on the local governmental level must
be predicated on districts of substantially equal population. This, of course, might
well destroy the flexibility the Court approved in Ditsch and Sailors.
41 394 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
UNITED STATES v. JACKSON
fill every seat.42 There was little doubt that the Alabama law was on the
books to keep Negroes from "single shot" voting one of their race onto
the city council. The court's application of Avery probably denied a
significant racial minority a chance to gain at least one voice on Bir-
mingham's city council. However, Avery dealt with a completely dif-
ferent circumstance than "single shot" voting, and it need not have been
applied in such an inflexible manner to the set of facts found in Gordon.
The court in Gordon actually took a portion of the language in Avery
out of context to support its decision. 3
Even in a situation where it is applied too rigidly, such as in Gordon,
the one man, one vote rule has a saving feature. In American life there
is really no such thing as a monolithic majority with one or a few over-
riding interests. "[T]he majority is but a coalition of minorities which
must act in a moderate, broadly representative fashion to preserve itself.""
In other words, the political majority cannot long ignore various mi-
nority interests in governing without offending all or some of the many
minorities of which it itself is composed. Thus, there is a strong argu-
ment that the one man, one vote concept-while not perfect-nevertheless
is the best rule in a representative democracy, even on the local level of
government with its many complex governing bodies. But it should not
be applied in inappropriate situations, as was done in Gordon, and the
courts should apply it flexibly, using the rationale of Dusch where ap-
posite.
TiHOMAS F. LOFLIN III
Criminal Law-United States v. Jackson and Its Impact Upon
State Capital Punishment Legislation
INTRODUCTION
The provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act subject a defendant to
the risk of death if he is tried by a jury, but to no more than life imprison-
"Id. at 4.
Compare the paragraph in which the court in Gordon quotes Avery, 394
F.2d at 4, with the actual context of that language in Avery itself, 390 U.S. at
480-81.
" Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 52.
'18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) provides that:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, ab-
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